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The following pa.per
presented at the Pacific Division meeting
of the Society for the Study of Ethics
and Animals in san Francisco, March,

(1) Agents need not be noral agents.
Ckle may act purposefully without being capa
capa.Be
ble of comprehending noral principles.
Besides "agents," beings in this category can
be called (like noral
rroral agents) "persons" in
Joel Feinberg's sense and "subjects-of-lives"
in Tam Regan's sense. According to Feinberg,
"In the commonsense way of thinking, persons
are those beings who, arrong other things, are
conscious, have a concept and awareness of
themselves, are capable of experiencing erroemo
tions, can plan ahead, can act on their
plans, and can feel pleasure and pain."[3]
"Person" is a notoriously slippery term.
Same use it interchangeably with "human" or
considera
mean by it no more than "norally
"rrorally considerable. "
Same would restrict it to noral
fonn
agents. By contrast, I find Feinberg's fonnulation admirable, and whenever persons are
paper,
referred to in the remainder of this pa.per,
However, the
it will be in this sense only.
emotive content
ambiguities and distracting errotive
one often finds in discussions of persons may
well have led Regan to re-name the category:
"individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they
meroo
have beliefs and desires; perceptions, merrory, and a sense of the future, including
emotional life together
their own future; an errotional
pain; prefeprefe
with feelings of pleasure and pa.in;
rence- and welfare-interests; the ability to
initiate action in pursuit of their desires
and goals; a psychophysical identity over
time; and an individual welfare in the sense
that their experiential lives fare well or
ill for them, logically independently of
inde
their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone
noral
else's interests. [4]
If there are rroral
patients, these beings appear to be strong
candidates for that position.

1987.

noral agents.
You and I are IlPral
We are
capable of understanding and acting upon
noral principles. [1] Provided that we do not
IlPral
act under duress, we are responsible for what
noral agents, we alone have IlPral
noral
we do.
As IlPral
obligations and can be held accountable for
noral codes
flouting those obligations.
All IlPral
are addressed to us.
So are the following
noral agents, all
questions:
,Are we, as IlPral
~;rally considerable;
~;ra.lly
i.e., are others (also
noral agents) directly obligated to take our
IlPral
interests into account when their actions
norally
would affect us?
Are we all equally IlPrally
not, meremere
significant, entitled to be treated not.
ly

means to further others'
purposes?
nora! agents be
beings who are not IlPral
norally considerable; i.e., are there any
IlPrally
noral pa.tients?[2]
patients? [2]
noral papa
IlPral
I f there are IlPral
tients, are they as norally significaat as we
noral pa.tients
patients more nora11y
are?
Are some IlPral
fun
significant than others?
These are all funques
damental,
extraordinarily important quesdiffi
tions.
They are also extraordinarily difficult to answer.
Can

as

a\1..~·'
an<~"

salle Candidates for Moral Patiency
Some

candi
Let us begin by considering some candipatiency.
dates for noral pa.tiency.
Those nost under
(1) agents who are not
discussion have been (I)
noral agents, (2) self-conscious beings, (3)
conscious beings, (4 ) living beings, or (in
(inob
creasingly under discussion (5) natural obargued.
jects or systems.
Philosophers have argued,
that norally relevant similarities
s:imilarities between
beings in a given category and IlPral
noral agents
(who nost assume are IlPrally
norally considerable)
justify the ascription of rights or rroral
standing to thOSE; beings.
Space
Spa.ce limitations
l:imitations
prevent me frOOI considering the last two
mentioned categories (living beings and nana
tural objects or systems) here. This limita
l:imitation is in no way meant to suggest that such
norally considerable. We
beings could not be rrorally

Other beings have lesser abilities.
(2) other
Can a self-conscious being fail to be an
agent, person, or subject-of-a-life? Yes, if
that being's ability to act to fulfill goals
is severely diminished or non-existent.
The
being may be physically or mentally incapable
of agency but, have some awareness (perhaps
rudimentary at best) of self. Possibly, such
patients.
beings are noral
rroral pa.tients.
Many would deny
this.
(3) Beings who can be aware, in sane
sense, of their surroundings but not of them
themselves are often called "merely"
"rroerely" conscious.

will have quite enough complications if we
confine our attention to the first three
patiency.
candidates for noral pa.tiency.
A brief look
33
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mentality to hillllaIl beings, would have us
accept the following rather dubious contrast:
a screaming, struggling child being dragged
to the doctor for her second shot has beliefs
about what is in store for her and desires to
stay home instead, but a yelling, thrashing
cat on the way to the vet for his second
visit is just exercising his limbs and vocal
cords!

They too might be moral patients.
The legilegi
timacy of this moral patiency candidate is
far more hotly disputed than the two others
mentioned above.
The further we depart from
the qualities which characterize moral agenagen
cy, the more contestable our candidates for
moral patiency becx:me.
(Of course, one must
not allow the relative p:Jpularity or unp:JpUunp:JpU
larity of our candidates to· decide the issue.
It may not be coincidental that we see ourour
selves as the paradigms of moral consideraconsidera
bility.
One's decisions about who or what
"measures up" morally may be far from objecobjec
tive. )

In addition to double-standard thinking,
one also finds the fallacy of false dilermna
cormnitted by some critics of nonhillllaIl agency.
For example, Michael A. Fox has said that
animals cannot lead lives or be autonomous
----because autonomy requires that one can "gene"gene
rate a life plan" to guide one's life as a
whole. (8]
But surely this is to conflate
"highly autonomous" with "autonomous."
No
distinction is made between the purposeful
agent who acts with a life plan in view and
the purposeful agent who has shorter-range
plans.
As Regan has argued, many nonhuman
animals may lack the high level of autonomy
required for moral agency, but they do exhiexhi
bit "preference autonomy."(9] '!his descripdescrip
tion fits many young and "defective" humans
as well. All are agents.

'!he categories above plainly cut across
species lines.
No one denies that there are
hillllaIls who are "merely" conscious, but it is
also true that some agents are not hillllaIl.
Agency as such requires self-consciousness,
desires, and some degree of reasoning abiliabili
ty; it does not require heights of intellecintellec
tual sophistication in the way moral agency
does.
For example, we do not require agents
to be skilled in deductive reasoning (let
alone predicate logic), but we do require
some inductive abilities.
Again, one can
plan for the next five minutes, for the next
hour, for the next week, or for years in
advance and be an agent.
You don't have to
plan for the next fifty years in order to be
an agent.
Some understanding is surely rere
quired for agency; the ability to read The
New York Times is not. There is no reason to
think that the skills required for purposeful
action are restricted to members of the human
species, and ample reason to think they are
not. Recent ethological studies sUpp:Jrt this
conclusion. (5]

Sad!y, there are other hillllaIls who do not
even have preference autonomy.
Conscious
hillllaIls exist who cannot act to satisfy very
fundamental needs.
Although at one p:Jint
Regan claims that such hillllaIls are "subjects"subjects
of-lives,"(lO] they are not, since they rail
to satisfy (at the very least) his action
requirement.

It is imp:Jrtant to remember these realireali
ties about humans and nonhillllaIls as we consiconsi
der abstract arguments about moral patiency.
But how do we even begin to determine whether
there are moral patients (i.e., beings who
are morally considerable without being moral
agents)?
What characteristics must a being
p:Jssess to be morally considerable?
How can
we defend the claim that, e.g., "mere" agency
is sufficient for moral considerability but

Nevertheless, some humans continue to
express considerable skepticism about the
p:Jssibility of nonhillllaIl agency. For example,
the Cartesian view that thought requires
linguistic ability has been revived in a
highly sophisticated form by R. G. Frey. (6]
He denies that nonhillllaIl animals can have
desires (and thus that they can act purposepurpose
fully) on the grounds that beliefs are rere
quired for desires and linguistic ability is

that "mere" consciousness is not?
Or that
only moral agency suffices for moral consiconsi
derability?
And how can we argue about dede
grees, if any, of moral significance? What
would even count as a resolution of these
problems?

required for beliefs (an ability he assumes
nonhuman animals lack).
This view has been
skillfully refuted by others on a number of
grounds, (7] so I will not pursue it further
here, except to make one observation. Those
who, like Descartes (but unlike Frey), refuse
to extend their skepticism about nonhuman
BE'I'WEEN THE SPECIES
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and. sufficient
moral considerability and
for
E.g., one could claim
restricted rights.
that moral agents are due the full range of
suf
rights but that being a "mere" agent is sufand. only
ficient for moral considerability and
some rights.
Concerning moral significance,
partial views fall into three sub-categories:

Rights Views, Perfectionism,
and utilitarianism
We IlIUst
must first identify the structural
features of different types of views on moral
considerability and significance.
I will be
perfection
distinguishing rights views from perfectionistic and utilitarian views.

a. The Equality View: All those who are
morally
considerable are equally morally
significant.
E.g., moral agents, "mere"
and. the "merely" self-conscious could
agents, and
be claimed to all be ends in themselves,
although all would not have the same rights
(such as the right to liberty).

Rights views all propose characteristics
(and. pospos
which are claimed to be sufficient (and
considerabili
sibly also necessary)for moral considerabiliand. maximum
ty
and
moral
significance. [11]
"Rights" are spoken of here in Feinberg's
sense of "valid claims." [12] It is basic
moral rights which are relevant here, the
and. well-being. On
rights to life, liberty, and
any of these views, morally considerable
cormnensur
beings are due treatment which is cormnensur-

b. The Additive View: Being t or u or v
considerabili
or ••• is sufficient for moral considerability.
However, the more such characteristics
one has, the more morally significant one
becanes.
Those who are maximally morally
becomes.
character
significant have all the relevant characteristics; i.e., they are X. E.g., the "merely"
self-conscious may be claimed to be less
morally significant than "mere" agents, who
are in turn less morally significant than
moral agents.

ate with their moral significance. Maximally
morally significant beings are to be treated
as ends in themselves rather than mere means.
Less significant morally considerable beings,
if any, may have their rights overridden in
signifi
favor of those who are more morally signifiIt is important to bear in mind that
cant.
whatever characteristic (X) a given rights
considera
view proposes as sufficient, moral considerability is really a cluster of characteristics
(t, u. v, ••• ). For example, if moral agency
is the proposed characteristic, being a ~
percharacter
son (which is itself a cluster of characteristics) who is capable of understanding and
acting in accordance with moral principles
would be the relevant constitutive features.
Brief
characterizations of the different
types of rights views, along with convenient
names for them, appear below.

c. The Combination View: A sub-cluster
-of the characteristics constitutive of being
X are sufficient for moral considerability
and equal moral significance with respect to
X's.
charac.1;er
XiS.
Possessing only some of the charac.:teristics of the sub-cluster is sufficient for
moral considerability but results in a lesser
degree of moral significance.
E.G., one
could claim that being a moral agent (X in
signi
this case) makes one maximally morally significant and that being a subject-of-a-life who
is 'not a moral agent is also sufficient for
maximum moral significance, but that being a
self-conscious nonagent or being "merely"
conscious results in a lesser degree of moral
significance.

--

suffi
1. The Total View: Being an X is sufficonsiderabili
cient and necessary for moral considerability.
All X's
XiS are equally morally significant
and. possess the full range of rights.
Ac
and
According to this view, being merely t or u or
v or ••• , cannot be sufficient for moral
considerability.
E.g., one might claim that
being ~ moral agent is necessary and suffisuffi
cient for moral considerability.
Being a

No'N,
Now,

I IlIUst
must introduce a further canpli-

person or agent who is not a moral agent
considerabil
would not qualify one for moral considerability (although moral agents might still have
indirect duties to one).
2. The Partial View:
Being an X is
sufficient for moral considerability
and
necessary for the whole range of rights.
Being t or u or v or ••• is sufficient for

.

G,atton,
Caro::' Belolln.er G,atton.

JIt.:llm/ll
Old-Faahlonl!d JIt.:l.lm/ll
I'ev !o.rk:' Oo"e.l:,

.
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cation in my characterization of types of
rights views.
The total and partial views
can each be IlDdified to allow potential X' s
or those who are potentially t or u, etc., to
be roorally considerable.
Potential roorally
counts just as much as actuality on what
Feinberg calls "The strict Potentiality CriCri
terion. " According to "The Gradualist PotenPoten
tiality Criterion," the closer one comes to
being the specified sort of being (i.e., the
roore one's potential is actualized), the roore
roorally significant one becomes. [13]
The
different rights views could be IlDdified in
either way, [14] although the gradualist apap
proach is roore plausible.
Whatever is decideci
ded, we must be careful to distinguish being
a potential X (or t or u, etc.) fran being a
near X (or t or u, etc.) who can never become
X{or t or u, etc).
On the IlDdified total
view, potential XiS are roorally considerable,
but near X' s who are not potential X's are
not, even if they have the same actual charchar
acteristics.
On the IlDdified partial view,
being t or u, etc., but falling short of
being X, is sufficient for rooral consideraconsidera
bility whether or not one is a potential X.

Regan's Defense of Moral Patiency
These alternatives are radically differdiffer
ent.
Just how difficult it is to defem
one's choice among them is well illustrated
by the work of Tom Regan, one of the roost
skillful proponents of noral patiency.
The
Case for Animal Rights is a magnificent
achievement~owever, Regan's attack on
certai.n views of rooral considerability and
significance leaves some key objections unun
forestalled. After raising these objections,
I will offer a possible solution which has
been inspired by the work of Alan Gewirth.
Regan defends a rights view.
He agrees
that rooral agency is sufficient for noral
considerability and basic rooral rights but
denies that it is necessary.
Those humans
and nonhurnans who, like moral agents, are
subjects-of-lives but are not rooral agents,
are moral patients.
They are roorally consiconsi
derable and just as roorally significant as
rooral agents.
He does not insist that being
a subject-of-a-life is necessary for rooral
considerability, although he suspects that it
may be. He seriously doubts that any who are
not subjects-of-lives could be as roorally
significant as those who are. [16]
Thus,
Regan proposes a canbination rights view:
being X,· where X refers to being a moral
agent, is sufficient for rooral considerabiliconsiderabili
ty and maximum moral significance, but a subsub
cluster of the characteristics which consticonsti
tute rooral agency, viz., being the subjectsubject
of-a-life, is also sufficient for rooral concon
siderability and maximum rooral significance.
Those who don't have all the characteristics
in the sub-cluster (e.g., the "merely" concon
scious) may be roorally considerable but not
as roorally significant.
Regan's strategy is
to reject alternative views, to postulate the
equal inherent value of rooral agents and
certain others, and to propose "being the
subject-of-a-life"
as the relevant moral
similarity between rooral agents and these
others. They are due equal respect, he says.

These rights views, IlDdified or unroodiunroodi
fied, are to be distinguished sharply fran
perfectionism.
According to this view, pospos
sessing a given characteristic (e.g., intelintel
ligence) is sufficient for some degree of
rooral significance but not for maximum rooral
significance.
One's rooral significance is
claimed to increase as the degree to which
one possesses the favored
characteristic
increases.
Nietzsche is the roost famous
advocate of this view.
Perfectionism and the rights views must
also be distinguished fran utilitarianism
(nothing hinges here on the distinction bebe
tween rule- and act-utilitarianism).
Unlike
the rights views, utilitarianism is opposed
to rights (although some utilitarians tolertoler
ate a watered-down notion of rights); unlike
perfectionism, it awards no increasing rooral
significance to higher degrees of intelliintelli
gence or other favored characteristics.
In
an important respect, utilitarianism can be
construed as denying that one has direct
duties to any individual.
One's duty on
classical utilitarianism is to prcm:>te happihappi
ness as such; insofar as it is individuals
who are the receptacles of happiness, one has

How does one test alternative views on
rooral considerability and significance?
Re
Regan argues that we require such a view to
display adequacy of scope, precision, and

conf;rmity with our reflective intuitions.
The last test is the critical one.
It rere
quires that we judge the view coolly, rationration
ally, clearly, with ·as much infonnaqon as we
can gather, and that we take an impartial

indirect duties to them.
Nonhedonistic verver
sions have the same implication. [15]
36
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attitude.
Regan refers to impartiality in
this context as "the fonnal principle of
justice. "
It enjoins us to treat similar
dissimi
cases similarly and dissimilar cases dissimilarly.
larly.[l7]
[17]
Regan opposes views which deny
moral considerability to those who are not
moral agents or which assign them lesser
moral significance. According to him, how do
these views fail to be adequate?

.. "..,

WJ:i!£1

ther, and to what degree, one is intelligent,
lot
skillful, etc., depends on "the natural lottery. " Those who come up short don't deserve
to have lesser moral significance any more
than those at the other end of the ability
scale deserve more. [20] Such treatment is
radically unfair.
This
objection won't
do,
however.
First, if Regan is arguing that moral consiconsi
derability and significance must not be based
on characteristics over which one has no
control, his own
CMIl view is in trouble.
We do
not choose to be subjects-of-lives any more
than an anoeba chooses not to be one.
one.
I
don't think Regan would want to say that
there is no moral distinction between the
second, while I agree with Regan that
two.
Second,
at this point how is
perfectionism is unjust, ~
one to argue for this without begging the
question?
Perfectionists would claim that
their view passes Regan's tests, including
They cercer
the test of impartial reflection.
tainly do treat similar cases similarly and
dissimilar cases dissimilarly, given their
criteria of moral significance. How can they
be answered?

Here is one important argument:
"Nor
can we avoid recognizing that moral patients
fall within the [respect] principle's scope
on the grounds that they have no inherent
value or less inherent value than moral
agents; this will not do because attempts to
disenfranchise moral patients in this way
will lay the groundwork for a perfectionist
theory of justice, a theory that will either
sanction unjust treatment of some
moral
agents or avoid this--but only at the price
of arbitrariness. [18] Regan is saying that
those who favor moral agents, exclusively or
to a greater degree, are either consistent or
inconsistent perfectionists.
Inconsistent
perfectionists refuse to discriminate against
re
moral agents who are less intelligent, rehapPy, etc., than oth¥ moral
flective,
agents, but those who fall short of being
moral agents are morally penalized for their
perfection
lesser abilities. [19] Consistent perfectionists, on the other hand, will have to assign
lesser and greater moral significance to
abili
moral agents too, depending on their abiliade
ties.
Such a view fails to provide an adequate interpretation of justice, Regan says.

op
Moreover, what about rights views opposed to Regan's own
CMIl which are not reducible
to perfectionism?
The total version of the
prirracy of moral agency view holds that being
primacy
a moral agent is necessary and sufficient for
moral considerability.
Those "disenfran"disenfran
canmunity are excluded
chised" fran the moral ccmnunity
because they are not moral agents, not be
because
Cause they are "lesser" moral agents.
Simi
Similarly, the additive version of the primacy of
moral agency view holds that the different
characteristics which make one a moral agent
are each morally significant and that the
more of these characteristics one possesses
the more morally significant one is.
One's
-do with the ~ to
status has nothing to ·00
which one possesses a given morally relevant
characteristic. Is there a way to show these
views wrong?

perfec
Regan is right in holding that perfectionism would serve very
very·-ill
ill as a basis for
a view which postulates the moral primacy of
moral agents.
Obviously, the inconsistent
version fails the test of rationality.
But
rrajor problems remain.
con
two major
First, the consistent version needs to be shown
shCMIl to be inin
adequate.
adequat~.
Second, Regan's criticisms do not
touch the nonperfectionistic alternatives,
addi
most importantly the total view and the additive view.

Regan does indeed offer arguments which
ex
would apply to these views.
He does an excellent job arguing against particular moral
agency views such as those held by
and
Rawls. [21]
The trouble is that these views
could be amended in the light of several of
his criticisms; he needs objections so fundafunda
mental that ~ primacy of moral agency view
would be subject to them.
He presses just

Concerning the first problem, Regan does
offer an argument against the consistent
version of perfectionism, certainly an imporimpor
ar
tant canpetitor of his rights view.
He arun
gues that this view must be rejected as unjust because it bases moral significance on
the presence or absence of abilities over
aa:.IUisition one has no control.
Whe
whose aa;ruisition
Whe37
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such an objection against Kant (who holds a
total vielY'). Those who deny that nonrational
beings are norally considerable fail to pass
the test of impartiality, he urges.
Let's
grant that it would be wrong to torture a
noral agent for fun.
Now, imagine torturing
someone who isn't a noral agent, like a human
child (to avoid the potentiality canplicacanplica
tion, let's stipulate that the child is sese
verely retarded).
FeIY' would deny that the
child suffers just as a noral agent would.
But this, and this alone, Regan says, is the
norally relevant similarity between the two
in this hypothetical case:
"The issue concon
cerns their shared capacity for suffering,
not their differing abilities, otherwise we
flaunt the requirement of fOl:mal justice: we
allow
dissimilar treatment of relevantly·
similar cases. II [22] The same kind of criticriti
cism would apply to the additive view, acac
cording to which the child's suffering would
not count ~ RUlch ~ the suffering of a nora!
agent.
Regan claims that all such vielY's are
arbitrary: the kind of hann inflicted is the
same, regardless of whether one is a noral
agent.

does in Chapter 7, that the subject-of-a-life
view passes the tests just isn't enough.
It
seems we have reached a relativistic imim
passe. [2S]
A Possible Solution
At this point, I would like to suggest a
possible way out.
I am going to use a line
of reasoning developed by ethical theorist
Alan Gewirth to sketch a defense of a cc:xnbicc:xnbi
nation vielY' very like Regan's.
If this line
of reasoning is correct, it will illuminate
what is wrong with the alternative vielY'S.
Gewirth himself believes his vielY' to have
very different implications, but I will argue
that this is not the case.
All noral codes are action guides adad
dressed to those of us capable of understandunderstand
ing and acting on them.
In his important
book, Reason and Morality, [26] Gewirth argues
that those of us trying to determine which
noral code, i f any, to follow RUlst begin by
asking what is required for action itself.
Doing so will provide us with reasons to
becane active noral agents and will in addiaddi
tion allow us to reject a number of ethical
vielY's.

This is similar to Regan's criticism of
perfectionism, and, unfortunately, it too
fails to forestall a very difficult reply.
The total and additive vielY' advocates would
emIiIatically deny that their vielY'S fail to be
impartial.
The cases of the noral agent and
the retarded child are relevantly dissimilar,
they would say:
to claim that suffering is
the sole issue is to beg the question against
these views.

cnly agents are capable of action.
A
Agents are able to control their own behavior,
have knowledge of the relevant proximate
circumstances of their actions, and have
goals or purposes they wish to fulfill. [27]
As reflective agents (the only agents who
could ever be IOOral agents), we are able to
identify the necessary preconditions of our
agency.
We require (l) the ability to have
purposes and (2) the freedan which would
allow us to pursue those purposes. The abilabil
ity to have purposes itself has precondiprecondi
tions:
life and minimal mental and physical
capabilities. Beyond these basic conditions,

The trouble is that impartiality is a
formal requirement which all but the nonnon
universal ethical egoist (whose vielY' has
plenty of other problems) would embrace.
This principle cannot decide the issue.
Re
Regan is aware of this, he point out that a
nonnative interpretation of justice is rere
quired to spell out what counts as a norally

a certain quality of life is required for
purposiveness:
one RUlSt not have to fear
constantly losing what has already been atat
. tained, and one RUlSt have the opportunity to
increase one's gains.
The life and quality
of life conditions are canbined by Gewirth
under the heading of "well-being." This tenn
designates the abilities and condilions nene
cessary for agents to maintain and obtain
what they desire in general. [28] Freedan and
well-being are, then, necessary for agents to
achieve their goals.

relevant similarity or
dissimilarity. [23]
But how are we to decide which interpretation
of justice to adopt?
By applying the same
tests of scope, precision, and conformity to
our reflective intuitions, which must be
cool, clear, rational, infonned, and ~
tial, in the formal sense.
The total and
additive vielY' advocates, as well as the perper
fectionist and the utilitarian[24] would all
say that their views do pass these tests. How
is one to reply to them?
To show, as Regan
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES
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rational, reflective agents who wish both to
be consistent and to achieve our purposes
when he leads us to reject these views.

transcenden
The next step in Gewirth' s transcendenarguII¥3I1t is to say that all reflective
tal arguIlEI1t
agents at least implicitly claim freedom and
pre
well-being as rights.
These claims are prescriptions which mean at the mininn.nn that
free
others should not interfere with one's freedom
and well-being. [29]
Any
reflective
agents who do not make such claims at least
implicitly could not desire to fulfill their
purposes-which would mean that they are not
agents at all. [31] All reflective agents
llUlSt,
IlU.1St, on pain of contradiction, make these
claims. [ 31 ]

Next, Gewirth' s line of reasoning leads
m:>ral agency is
us to reject the view that IOOral
necessary for IOOral
m:>ral considerability and maximaxi
1I1I.IlII
m:>ral significance.
mum IOOral
The PGC applies to
all who have purposes they want to fulfill,
freedcm and well-being just
for they require freedom
as we do.
They do not have to claim freedcm
freedom
m:>r
and well-being as rights in order to be IOOrally considerable.
Not all agents have the
ability to conceptualize the PGC.
They are
m:>ral rights. [34] (Of
still, ~ agents, due IOOral
course, their right to freedcm
freedom may have to be
abridged when they threaten the freedcm
freedom or
m:>ral
well-being of others.
That holds for IOOral
rea
agents too.) According to this line of reasoning, those with "preference autonomy" are
m:>ral canmunity:
ccmmunity:
fully included in the IOOral
as
m:>ral patients rather than as IOOral
m:>ral agents.
IOOral

At this point, reflective agents are not
m:>ral agents because they are
yet active IOOral
considering only their own
CMIl
interests.
The
transforma
extension to others (and thus the transformam:>ral agency in the active sense)
tion to IOOral
occurs when those agents realize that what
justifies their rights claims is the fact
~ agents.
is
that they ~
The fact that one~
Arabella WOpenschm:i.dt,
wopenschmidt, white American };hysi
physicist, is irrelevant to one's claims. Agents
who claim freedom and well-being, claims that
are justified by their purposive natures, who
deny the freedom and well-being of other
agents contradict themselves.
This is the
heart of Gewirth' s argument for what he calls
m:>rality:
"the supreme principle of IOOrality:
Act in
reci
accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself" (the principle of
re
generic consistency [PGC]). [32] Further reflection on our part indicates that some
recipients of our action are due IOOre
m:>re than
our noninterference.
We have positive obliobli
gations too:
to help them avoid hann when
doing so causes us no canparable losses and
to aid those who, through no fault of their
own,
CMIl, cannot achieve well-being. [33]
Following this line of reasoning,

What about those who are not ~
m:>ral considerability?
agents?
Do they lack IOOral
m:>ral significance?
Or are they of lesser IOOral
Gewirth's short answer is that as. long as
m:>r
they have purposes or desires, they are IOOrally considerable. Having purposes one wants
to fulfill or have fulfilled is the basis for
the claim to the right of well-being. Having
freedcm is based on another
the right to freedom
aspect of agency, the ability to fulfill
purposes.
Those who lack that ability will
have no right to unrestricted freedcm
freedom but
will retain the right to well-being.
More
Moreover, Gewirth holds that potential agents are
due "preparatory" rights to aid them in
achieving agency. [35] He believes (rightly,
I
think) that potential agency is m:>rally
rrorally
relevant, but he also holds that those who
m:>r
are only potentially purposive are less IOOrally significant than those who already have
even rudimentary desires.
Thus, he believes
that infants, who have rudimentary desires,
are due a full right to well-being, whereas
fetuses (who can have no desires, according
to his possibly mistaken view) are not due
the same full protection (i.e., in a conflict
well
between their lives and the life or wellbeing of a purposive being, they should be
sacrificed if there is no other way to re
resolve the conflict).[36]

it is

unjusti
clear that a perfectionistic view is unjustim:>re abilities are not to
fied.
Agents with IOOre
wopenschm:i.dt may be a
be favored.
Arabella wopenschmidt
m:>re intelligent, thoughtful agent than Hulk
IOOre
m:>ral premium.
Hogan, but that gives her no IOOral
What counts--and what is sufficient for the
m:>ral rights, other
full range of basic IOOral
e:rual--is that both are purposepurpose
things being equal--is
ful beings.
Utilitarianism is also undercut
by this reasoning: we owe agents respect for
their rights as agents.
The PGC enjoins us
to respect other purposive beings as we do
ourselves 1 it does not impose on us the over
ourselves;
overriding duty to maximize happiness or other
Gewirth appeals to us as
noIlIlDral goods.

Those beings with desires or purposes
are not yet able to carry out their own
CMIl
purposes do not have the full range of rights
m:>st emphatically
emJ;hatically
due an agent, but they are IOOSt

who
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equally I1Drally considerable on Gewirth's
view.
We I1Dral agents have I1Dre ];Ositive
obligations to them than we do to other I1Dral
agents: we should act to further their wellwell
being whenever we reasonably can.
Thus,
"deficient" humans are on equal I1Dral footing
with nonnal humans, so long as they have even
primitive desires. [37] We see that Gewirth
rejects what I have called the additive view;
fewer rights don "t translate into decreased
I1Dral significance.

On the face of it,
this Gewirthian cancan
bination view goes further than
Regan's
rights view.
Regan argues for the equal
inherent
worth of all subjects-of-lives,
which as he has defined it means
"all
agents. "
Beings with desires who are unable
by their very nature to carry out those dede
sires would appear to be excluded.
Yet,
Regan notes that severely deficient humans,
who cannot satisfy even "basic needs and
correlative
desires,"
are
subjects-of
subjects-oflives. [43] This puzzle is resolved when one
realizes that Regan has given us another,
less restrictive definition of his key rroral
notion:
"A sufficient condition of being
arred such duties [of justice] is that one
have a welfare--that one be the experiencing
subject of a life that fares well or ill for
one as an individual--independently of whewhe
ther one has a conception of what this
is. " [44] Deficient humans are included under
this definition, and rightly so.
According
to this "welfare criterion," one need not be
an agent to be fully I1Drally significant.

I disagree with Gewirth about sane of
the implications he believes his view to
have.
For example, he does not believe that
nonhuman animals can occupy the same I1Dral
];Osition as nonnal and deficient humans. His
belief is in part based on false empirical
assumptions and in part based on a perva&;i.ve
haoocentric bias evident in his work. On the
empirical side, he doubts that animals can be
agents; he even assumes that severely defidefi
cient humans are far closer to agency than
nonhuman animals. [38] The truth is the oppooppo
site.
Animals in the wild, apart fran the
extremely young, far eclipse sane humans in
their mental developnent and their capslcity
to achieve their goals.
Gewirth I S hanocenhanocen
trism is evident too: he takes himself to be
defending the view that basic rights are
human, [39] that "all humans are actual, prospros
pective, or ];Otential agents"[40] (contrary
to what he later admits about defective huhu
mans), that having rights is necessarily concon
nected to being human, [41] and that "for
human rights to be had one IlRlst only be
human."[42]
When his views are separated fran mistamista
ken assumptions and the inconsistencies of
haoocentrism, we see that what remains is
that (1) all I1Dral agents are I1Drally consiconsi
derable and maxi.ma.lly I1Drally significant,
(2) all agents, human and nonhuman, are likelike
wise maxi.ma.lly significant, (3) pw:posive
beings, human and nonhuman, with a restricted
or nonexistent ability to carry out their
pw:poses are equally I1Drally significant,
although they cannot be said to have the
right to freedcm, (4) ];Otential agents who
are not yet pw:posive are m:>rally consideraconsidera
ble but not as m:>rally significant as the
others above.
This view is an example of
what I have called the canbination view.
If
the reasoning here is correct, the alternaterna
tive rights and nonrights views are unaccepunaccep
table to the rational agent.
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

But what status, on such a view, does
the so-called "merely" conscious being have?
D:> we have direct duties to such a being, or
is it merely "a sacred symbol of the real
40
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should flip a coin to determine who dies.
Suppose that a "merely" conscious being and a
reflexively self-conscious being must have
oroer to live, but we only
our assistance in order
have the resources to save one.
Now suppose
that either being would be harmed by death,
a·~_
a·~.
least in the sense that any further
experiences would be precluded for
that
being.
Regan has argued that if we IlUJst
choose between hanning
harming one IIDrally
xoorally considera
considerasitu
ble being rather than another in such a situation and if one of the beings would be
banned less by our actions than the other, we
ought to bann that being rather than the
other. Such a decision would in no way imply
a lack of equal respect for the two beings.
He goes on to suggest that loss of life may
be a IlUJch greater bann to one being than to
another. [49]
Perhaps--we IlUJst be very caucau
tious
here-a reflexively
self-conscious
banned by death than one
being would be nore
roore harmed
who is not.
If this can be made out, and i f
it would be wrong to cause one being IIDre
xoore
bann than another when that can be avoided,
and if both would otherwise
otheIWise die,
die,·- then the
"merely" conscious being should die instead
of the reflexively self-conscious
being.
Note, however, that this line of reasoning
would not justify experimenting on the fonner
oroer to save the life of the lat
being in order
latter.
We would not be shcMing equal respect
for the two if we did this, since we would be
treating the fonner as a mere means.
weans.

tiling," as Feinberg would say, [45] to be propro
tldng,"
tected on utilitarian grounds alone?
Regan
suggests this may be so when he speculates
that such a being may be a mere receptacle
for intrinsic value rather than being valuavalua
ble in its own right. [46] (It is fascinating
that he and Singer, who differ on so IlUJch
here;
else, reach the same conclusion here:
both
treat the self-conscious as irreplaceable and
the ''merely'' conscious as replaceable receprecep
tacles of value.)
I can only speculate here about this
very troubling issue.
Is self-consciousness
de
a prerequisite for having preferences, deprecondi
sires, or purposes (i.e., is it a precondition for having a welfare)? If it is, then I
have serious doubts about whether anything
living is merely conscious.
The newborn has
preferences, although it is not self-conself-con
scious in the fully reflexive sense of the
tenn.
Might it not be self-conscious in
term.
another sense, having something akin to what
Sartre calls a "horizon" surrounding its
consciousness [47]--being thus very simply
self-aware?
If this is denied-if fully
reflexive self-consciousness is declared to
be the only kind--then it seems that one does
prefe
not have to be self-conscious to have preferences.
Having preferences enables one to
rea
have a welfare, and this-following the reasoning
sketched above--is sufficient for
noral
con
rooral considerability. [47]
The only conscious being I can conceive of who would not
be norally
roorally considerable would be one who
under
could not care about what states it undergoes, who could not have preferences, even
potentially.
Perhaps a highly soI;histicated
robot could fit this description, but the
humans and nonhumans we have contact within
this world do not.

If what has been said in the last secsec
tion of this paper is correct, there are a
great many moral
rooral patients we IIDral
xooral agents are
ex
obligated to consider.
Determining the extent to which we should not interfere with
those beings and the extent to which we
should assist them is no easy matter.
One
cxxoe IlUJch closer
hopes that one day we will cane
to giving other IIDrally
xoorally considerable beings
the respect which is due them, whatever our
recoro so
specific obligations may be.
OUr record
far has been nothing short of dismal.

If conscious beings who are not, and
never will be, reflexively self-conscious are
norally
roorally considerable, can they be said to be
pa
as norally
roorally significant as other noral
rooral patients and agents?
Or do they just have the
right not to be tortured wantonly? I want to
respect
,suggest that they are owed the same respectful treatment due other noral
rooral patients and
agents.
Since they care about what happens
to them (without knowing that they do), it
weans.
would be wrong to treat them as mere means.
However, this does not necessarily mean that,
in a case of unavoidable conflict between
their lives and the lives of noral
rooral agents or
reflexively self-conscious noral
rooral patients, we

Notes
1. Some I;hilosophers would dispute this
way of characterizing IIDral
xooral agency. Lawrence
Johnson, for example, has argued that one
need not understand ethical principles, or
indeed possess IIDral
xooral concepts at all, in
order to be a IIDral
xooral agent (see his "can
Animals Be Moral Agents?," Ethics ~
& Animals
4/2 (1983):
(1983) ; 50-61)
50-61 ) •
However, if we
~ were to
broaden the category of noral
rooral agent in this
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way, many who now believe it is prima facie
Wrong to harm noral agents \I1Ould simply rere
tract and refonnulate this view. I prefer to
follOW' Steve F. sapontzis here.
He argues
that animals are not "noral beings" (noral
agents in the reflective sense) but can inin
deed be 'virtuous (see his "Are Animals Moral
Beings?," American Philosophical Quarterly
17/1 (1980): 45-52).

welfare:
their lives "fare well or ill for
them logically independently" of their value
for others.
That does not make them "sub"sub
jects-of-lives" as he has defined the notion,
however. I will argue later that Regan realreal
ly offers two criteria for noral consideraconsidera
bility, both of which he calls "being the
subject-of-a-life."
11.
In this context, "necessary" means
"required for one to be justified in attriattri
buting noral considerability" and "suffi"suffi
cient" means "justifying ground for the atat
tribution of noral considerability. "
What
sort of justification one can get depends on
which metaethical theory is correct. All the
major theories except one, enotivism, imply
that some sort of justification is possible,
and enotivism is rightly not much defended
these days.
(For a nore detailed discussion
of ethical justification, see my "The JustiJusti
fication of an Envirorunental Ethic," EnvironEnviron
mental Ethics 5/1 (1983): 56-60.)

2. It is convenient for the prrposes of
this paper to define ''noral agent" and "nora!
patient" in IlD..ltual1y exclusive tenns.
Tan
Regan does this too (The Case for Animal
Rights (Berkeley:
University of California
Press, 1983): 151-6). However, I depart from
his sense of ''noral patient" in t\l1O respects.
Regan' s "noral patient" applies to a very
specific group, viz., subjects-of-lives. I
prefer not to restrict the tenn this way.
Moreover, in his sense, being a noral patient
carries no implication that anyone has noral
obligations to one. It seems nore natural to
me to build in this implication.

12. Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value
of Rights," The Journal of Value Inquiry 4
(1970).
This is the sense Regan adopts tOOl
see Chapter 8 of ~ Case for Animal Rights.

3.
Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," In Tan
Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death, sese
cond Edition (New York: Random House, 1986),
pp. 261-2.

13.
4.

Regan,

£12.

14. Feinberg and others have argued that
potentiality views oommit a fatal logical
error.
The strict view is said to confuse
being potentially qualified for rights with
having rights.
The gradualist view is said
to confuse being alnost qualified for rights
with being partially qualified for rights or
being qualified for weak rights (Feinberg,
ibid., 267, 269.). The criticism of gradualgradual
ism would also apply to the additive view.

5.

see Donald Griffin, The QIestion of
Animal Awareness (New York:
Rockefeller
University Press, 1981) and his Animal ThinkThink
~
(cambridge:
Harvard University Press,
1984).
Also, see Stephen Walker, Animal
Thought (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1983) and Stephen Clark, The Nature of the
Beast (Oxford:
Oxford University Press,
1982).
6.
Interests and Rights
Clarendon Press, 1980).

(Oxford:

The

I believe this criticism misconstrues
potentiality views.
The strict view claims
that being an actual or potential X is suffisuffi
cient for noral rights, not that being a
potential
rights-bearer is equivalent to
being a rights-bearer. Nor does the gradualgradual
ist view claim that being alnost qualified
for rights is equivalent to being qualified
for partial rightsl it takes rights claims to
be ordered on a continuum, increasing in
strength as one's potential is actualized.

7.
For excellent critiques, see Regan,
.912. cit., 38-49, and S. F. sapontzis, "Inte"Inte
rests and Animals,
Needs and Language, "
~ ~ Animals 4/2 (1983): 38-49.
8.
Michael A. Fox, The ~ for Animal
Experimentation (Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1986): 28-9.
9.
10.

(this view is particularly plausible given
Feinberg's
analysis of rights as
valid
claims. )
The critics interpret potentiality
views as presupposing their very denials 1

Regan,.912. cit., 84-6.
Ibid.,

Feinberg, "Abortion," 266-7.

cit., 243.

244.

But

they do have
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Anlinal Experimentation, 61. I have
Case for Anllnal
criticized Wreen's article in Ethics & Ani- - - - Ani
responses and
mals 5/4 (1984).
For further res~es
replies between us, see the 1986 issues of
Between the Species.)

this is unwarranted.

--

15. An interesting apparent exception to
this is Peter Singer's version of preference
utilitarianism (see his "Killing Humans and
145
Killing Animals," Inquiry 22/1-2 (1979): 14556). He holds that the basic moral principle
He
is to maximize preference satisfaction.
indi
argues that reflexively self-conscious individuals are not "mere receptacles of value"
as the "merely" conscious are said to be;
irreplacea
they are said to be prima facie irreplaceable, unlike the ,latter, because of their
preference to live.
This argument fails for
self
a variety of reasons.
Most important, selfre
conscious beings turn out to be just as replaceable on this form of utilitarianism as
on any other.
I discuss this argument in my
"On Replaceability," Ethics ~ Anllnals
Anlinals 3/4
(1982): 96-105.
See Tom Regan's excellent
dissection of Singer's view in The Case for
Animal Rights, 206-11.
16.

Regan, ibid, 246.

17.

Ibid, Chapter 4.

18.

Ibid., 260-1.

19.

Ibid., 240.

20.

Ibid., 234.

21.
Ibid., Chapter 5,
tions 5.4 and 5.5.

'.

23.

Regan, £E. cit., 232.
Regan,.9I2.

24.
utilitarians are apt to dismiss
quar
appeals to intuitions, but they have no quarrel against rationality, coolness, conceptual
clarity, being informed, and being impartial.
25.
One might think that a Rawls-type
approach to justice would help here, but it
would not.
Rawls' view, purged
plrged of its arbi
arbitrariness (Regan rightly points out that
those behind the veil of ignorance should not
be allowed to knCM that they will be human,
moral agents in the society whose rules they
(£E. cit., 170-3», would seem
are deciding (9.E.
to ensure an egalitarian outcome for moral
agents and patients, but it does not. Apart
assmnption that self-inteself-inte
fram the dubious assumption
rest lies at the basis of ethics, this
(otherwise nonarbitrary) Rawlsian view cannot
caIUlOt
Kan
exclude the dedicated perfectionists, Kantians, and others we have been discussing.
These people would interpret justice in the
ways their theories prescribe, regardless of
in
the consequences they might suffer when incarnated in their chosen society.

26.
Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality
(Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press,
1978) •
A much briefer description of his
theory appears in Part 1 of his ~ Rights:
Essays on Justification and
Applications
(Chicago:
University
of Chicago Press,
1982).

sec
especially sec-

22.
Ibid.,
183.
Another argument
against the total view which Regan could have
pressed (but wisely did not) is that moral
agents would not deny basic moral rights to
those less fortunate than themselves (i.e.,
cannot be moral agents). The arguargu
those who caIUlOt
ment is that denial of rights in these cases
is unjust, that such beings, who had no
choice about their condition, do not deserve
such treatment.
The problem is that this
argument presupposes that those who are not
The
moral agents are morally considerable.
principle of justice, of treatment according
to desert, does not apply to those without
moral considerability.
Thus, this argument

27.

Reason and Morality, 27.

28.

Ibid., 64.

29.

Ibid., 78.

30. Gewirth argues that those agents who
deliberately act to limit their own freedom
or well-being are still, as they act (i.e.,
noninter
agents), claiming the right to noninterference.
(He further notes that mental,
gener
physical, or economic constraints are generally the reasons for such behavior) (ibid.,
264-7).

~

simply begs the question against the total
view.
(This very same argument is at' the
heart of some recent defenses of speciesism.
see Michael Wreen, "In Defense of Speciesism,
See
Anlinals 5/3 (1984): 47-60. Michael
Ethics ~ Anllnals
A. Fox also employed this argument in The

31.
43
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cautions us that he is not
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.
preconditions for action.
All beings like
the agent in the respect that they too need
freedan and well-being in order to fulfill
their purposes are then accorded the same
rights by that agent.
Plainly, it is not
necessary that these others also be capable
of conceptualizing the PGC.
Second, as we
shall see, Gewirth holds that some beings who
are not even preferentially autonomous (i.e.,
who are not even agents in the rn:i..nimal sense)
are due the right to well-being.
These
beings (e.g., children and the mentally dede
fective) need have no concept of the right to
well-being (let alone be able to claim it as
a right) in order to have that right.
This
is an extremely important part of Gewirth' s
overall view.
If he wants to retain it, he
must drop his repeated insistence that only
intellectually sophisticated moral agents can
have rights.

claiming that "X needs freedan and well-being
in order to act" logically necessitates "X
has the right to freedan and well-being. "
The necessity arises within the agent's viewview
point:
fran "X regards freedan and wellwell
being as necessary goods" it does follow that
"X. rationally claims the rights to freedan
and well-being" (ibid., 160-1). The distincdistinc
tion is crucial; this is Gewirth's way of not
being trapped by the "is/ought" problem.
32.
Ibid., 112. For Gewirth's extended
statement and defense of the PGC, see Reason
and Morality, Chapter 3.
A briefer accOlIDt
is given in "The Basis and Content of Human
Rights," Essay 1 in his ~ Rights.
33.

Reason and Morality, 312-7.

34. Gewirth is inconsistent on this very
inp:>rtant point.
His definition of "agent"
at the outset of his argument ("a being with
purposes he or she wants to fulfill, who has
control over his or her actions, and who
knCMS the relevant proximate circumstances of
those actions") includes no reference to the
ability to reflect on the abstract precondiprecondi
tions of actions.
He also makes a point of
arguing that agents with very low-level abilabil
ities are nevertheless agents with full moral
rights (ibid., 140) • He repeats this in his
later book ~ Rights, arguing that "mini"mini
mal rationality" in the sense spelled out
above is all that is required for agency and
the rights to freedan and well-being (p. 8) •
Beings who are only preferentially autoncm:>us
fit this description.
But in other passages
in which agency is characterized, he interpointerpo
lates the requirement that one be capable of
reflecting on the preconditions of action and
of claiming these as rights (pp., 120, 138).
See Human Rights, 11: "For a person to have
human rights, then, is for him to be in a
position to make morally justified stringent,
effective demands on other persons that they
not interfere with his having the necessary
goods of action and that they also help him

ReasOn and Morality, 142.

36.

Ibid., 142-3

37.

Ibid., 141-2.

38. see his description of their respecrespec
tive abilities on pages 141-2, 144.
39. Ibid., 317. He does, however, argue
that nonhuman animals have the right not to
have pain wantonly inflicted on them (p.
144).
40.

Ibid, 64.

41.

Ibid., 103.

42.
Ibid., 317.
As the title of his
more recent book, Human Rights, tells us, he
has not retreated fran a hcm:>centric posiposi
tion.

to attain these goods when he cannot do so by
his own efforts." In ~ and Morality,
this interpolation is not found; see pages
124, 133, and 180.
The interpolation should never have been
made.
First, the reasoning which leads to
the PGC hinges on the reflective agent's
recognizing that he or she has the rights to
freedan and well-being because these are the
.BEIWEEN THE SPECIES

35.

43.

Regan,~.

44.

Ibid., 171.

45.

Feinberg, "Abortion," 273.

46.

Regan, op. cit., 246.

cit., 244.

47.
Jean-Paul sartre, The Transcendence
of the .!E (New York:
Noonday Press, 1971):
75.
48.

One

philosopher who seems to think
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reflexively self-conscious can
that only the re£lexively
have aa genuine welfare is
is the Michael A. Fox
of The case
case for Animal Experimentation.
He
there claims that it .:is "completely spurious"
to speak of the
the lives
lives of those who are not
to
re£lexively
reflexively self-conscious as "more or less
'full,' 'satisfying,' and so forth," since
these beings cannot "re£lectively
"reflectively evaluate
the quality of their lives and
and find them a
cause of satisfaction or regret" (pp. 28-9).
Because of their lack of reflection, Fox says
that their "pleasurable experiences are not
valuable to them" (27), and in general "their
lives also cannot have intrinsic value or
value to themselves" (48).
Fox's view im
implies that, in a crucial sense, such beings
cannot fare well or ill because they are
unable to care about what hapPenS
happens to them.
(Fox does continue to use the word "welfare"
on occasion when referring to those he be
believes are not re£lexively
reflexively self-conscious.
meanin<jful
He also grants that "it would be meaningful
to say that it is in their interest (accords
preferences) to have
with their observed pre£erences)
pleasurable experiences repeat themselves"
(27).•
(27)
But as the implied reductionism in
this quote, in addition to the previous
quotes, indicates, this is "welfare" and
"interest" in a very attenuated sense of
these tenns at best.)

NUMBER 87

Might have been a rabbit,
or maybe a white rat.
Just another specimen,
but I recall it's number was "S7."
"87."
I think we poured something into its eyes,
or tried to give it cancer.
Funding is getting tighter,
a back-up disease is good business.
People believe we cure them
by what goes on here.
I guess we il..m
.s.m akin to gods.
I've forgotten our original theory,
but it still pays my salary.
Lucky that animals don't have feelings,
or we might be held accountable
for numberS7.
number 87.

Kathleen Malley

Although Fox makes all the above claims
about nonhuman animals, they apply rather
more accurately to very young or impaired
humans.
Before we decide that the lives of
babies and the severely senile cannot be
"more or less satisfying," let's consider
their "observed preferences" when they are
cuddled or beaten.
Don't they give every
indication that they are satisfied or greatly
distressed by what is being done to them?
Must they be able to tell themselves "my
life-quality has now taken a distinct down-

ward turn"
turn" in order to be dissatisfied by a
beating? Apart fran language,a tortured baby
normal human adult display
and a tortured no:cnal
"observedpre£erences."
remarkably similar "observed
preferences. "
How can Fox account for this?
Doesn't the
parsimony suggest that both care
principle of pirsimony
about what is happening to them?

49.
Regan, Ope cit., 324-5. I strongly
disagree with the way Regan applies this
reason
principle, however. He says that "no reasonde{ith of a
able person would deny" that the death
normal human is a gr~ter hann to that human
no:cnal
than the death of a dog is to the dog.
He
suggests that we ought to throw the dog out
of the proverbial lifeboat i f there isn't
sufficient roan on board for all the htnnans
humans
and the dog.
This seems to be a totally
uncharacteristic touch of human chauvinism on
Regan's part. For a thoughtful discussion of
this problem, see Henry Cohen's review of The
case ~ ~ Rights in Ethics ~ Animals
5/1 (1984): 11-4.
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